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Francesco Bellucci’s new book Peirce’s Speculative Grammar is great news to those 
many who take interest in Peirce’s semiotics, be they intellectual historians, Peirce 
scholars, logicians, philosophers, semioticians, pragmatists. It constitutes a great 
leap forward in understanding the intricacies, depths, problems, and possibilities 
of that doctrine.
Th is is a point where the amount of work that Hartshorne and Weiss put into 
Peirce’s Collected Papers (CP) in the 1930s has really become a source of confusion 
rather than enlightenment. Th e semiotics chapters of Volume 2 of the CP focus 
upon the icon-index-symbol distinction especially, and in the paragraphs from 
§2.219 to 2.308, they mix up numerous shorter and longer defi nitions ranging 
from 1893 to 1910, Peirce’s most explosive period of theory development, as if 
those text bits obviously referred to one and the same thing. What is worse, the 
representation of Peirce’s classic articulation of his sign theory – three trichotomies 
of sign aspects, resulting, by combination, in ten classes of signs – developed during 
the composition of the 1903 Syllabus manuscript, is cut up and disseminated 
over no less than three volumes of the book, namely §§ 2.219–226, 2.233–272, 
2.274–277, 2.283–284, 2.292–294, 2.309–331, 3.571–608 and 4.394–417. What is 
particularly troubling is that the two substantially diff erent Syllabus draft s of the 
very same theory, otherwise known as “Sundry logical conceptions” (§§ 2.274–
277, 2.283–284, 2.292–294, 2.309–3) and “Nomenclature and divisions of triadic 
relations” (2.233–272) appear in this mix with the more developed version (the 
“Nomenclature” with the three trichotomies) placed before the scattered parts of 
the less developed version (“Sundry ...” with its two trichotomies only). Surely, the 
publication of the CP was pioneering work making a wealth of valuable material 
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available for the fi rst time, and many scholars were able to gather a rough idea of 
the three-trichotomies-ten-signs theory from the jigsaw puzzle of the Collected 
Papers. But what they could not get at all – or at least not without a considerable 
amount of work – is any idea of how that theory quickly developed in the course 
of Peirce’s annus mirabilis 1903, nor the larger issue of how it had evolved out of 
Peirce’s many other semiotic sketches and speculations, all the way down from his 
early ideas of the 1860s, and how it fed into the grandiose, unfi nished draft  vistas of 
the post-Syllabus years of the 1900s. Th is state of things has been the root of many 
unfounded or even mistaken uses of Peirce’s semiotics where – to put it bluntly – 
readers have been able to project their own prejudices and folk theories about 
signs into some selected crumbs of text about icons and indices from Vol. 2 of the 
CP, rather than striven to understand what that theory, as a whole, really aims at, 
namely the analysis of propositions and inferences.
Th is condition considerably improved, however, with the publication of the two 
chronological volumes of Essential Peirce by the Indianapolis Peirce Project (EP1, 
EP2) in the 1990s which brought together large parts of the central Syllabus in Vol. 
2, Chapters 18–21, making it considerably easier to get a good grasp of the classic 
theory. Still, the obvious selection pressure on the two volumes naturally precluded 
them from giving any clear picture of the overall development of the sign theory. 
Th is condition only really improved on the publication of Tom Short’s monograph 
Peirce’s Th eory of Signs in 2007 with its more-than-30-pages second chapter on 
“Th e development of Peirce’s Semeiotic” covering the whole period from 1865 to 
1907. Th e Peirce Project’s grandiose chronological project of publishing Peirce’s 
Writings has, since its inception in the 1970s, covered the period up to the early 
1890s only and will not reach 1903 and beyond within any conceivable timeframe. 
Many of these problems evaporate, however, with the recent publication of 
the Italian scholar Francesco Bellucci’s magisterial monograph Peirce’s Specu-
lative Grammar. Bellucci picks Peirce’s systematic defi nition of his semiotics – 
‘Speculative Grammar’ – as the first, semiotic part of logic dealing with the 
description and analysis of sign aspects and types necessary to understand, in 
turn, the composition of propositions, their interrelations in arguments and their 
truth conditions, which are studied by Formal Logic or Logic Proper, fi nally to 
form the basis for Speculative Rhetoric or Methodeutic studying the philosophy 
of science issue of how actually to put into use logical structure in pragmatic 
scientifi c research with the aim of gaining new knowledge. Bellucci focuses upon 
the development during Peirce’s lifetime of the fi rst part of this trichotomy of logic, 
that is, Peirce’s semiotics. 
I have no reason to hide that I fi nd Bellucci’s endeavour going in the same 
overall direction as my own 2014 book Natural Propositions: Th e Actuality of 
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Peirce’s Doctrine of Dicisigns – in the sense that both of us insist upon the narrow 
ties between semiotics and logic in Peirce, so that the whole of Peirce’s enormous 
work with sign defi nitions is directly intended to serve the analysis of propositions 
and arguments, which remained the primary analytical target throughout his 
career. So, all of his defi nitions of icons, indices, and much more, are intended 
to make reasoning processes understandable in an overarching “Physiology of 
Arguments”. In my book, I focused upon the generalized proposition doctrine of 
Dicisigns as developed by Peirce in and aft er his classic 1903 doctrine – attempting 
some further developments of actual semiotics on that basis. Bellucci, of course, 
paints a much broader picture of the whole development of Peirce’s theory over his 
more-than-40-years period of scientifi c activity, giving us an understanding of the 
detail of that development which sets new standards for scholarship.
Bellucci’s overall argument claims that there are basically eight phases in the 
development of Peirce’s semiotics, the “classic” and most well-known 1903 phase 
constituting number seven among them, and he devotes a whole, detailed chapter 
to each phase in his chronological and systematic charting of the development of 
Peirce’s semiotics. 
Th e phases are not of equal importance. Th e fi rst phase is that of the 1860s when 
a surprisingly large bundle of Peirce’s basic and original ideas as to Speculative 
Grammar was articulated with the aim of analysing and understanding assertions 
and arguments. By comparison, the second phase of the 1870s around Peirce’s 
never published 1873 logic book introduces medieval realism, the idea that the 
proposition separately represents its object, and the basic ideas of pragmatism, 
which only marginally belong to Speculative Grammar. Th e third period brings 
another large step forward in the Speculative Grammar repercussions of the 
important Algebra of Logic formalizations of the early 1880s, particularly the idea 
that all propositions need all of the three sign types of symbol, index, and icon in 
order to be expressed. Th e fourth “How to reason” period of the early 1890s again 
appears as a minor period, even if both the Short Logic and the book of the chapter 
title, also nicknamed Grand Logic, were worked on then. Th e fi ft h, mid-to-late 
1890s saw crucial discoveries like the Existential Graphs and the metaphysical 
category of “would-be’s”, but again appears as a minor period in the development 
of Speculative Grammar, even if the development of certain problems now makes 
the early theory unstable. Th e sixth period, centred upon the “Minute logic”, 
appears as fairly important, characterized by the emergence of Peirce’s new idea 
of defi ning sign types via a combination of simpler sign aspect types – signalling 
what Bellucci calls the First Reform of Speculative Grammar. Still, it is dwarfed by 
the seventh period, Peirce’s annus mirabilis of 1903 when he seems to have been 
virtually boiling – writing both the Pragmatism Lectures, the Lowell Lectures, 
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and the various Syllabus sketches to accompany the latter. It is charaterized by 
Bellucci’s Second Reform of Speculative Grammar – arguably the most important 
phase since the founding period of the 1860s. Th e fi nal, eighth period introduces 
the Th ird Reform of subdividing the Object and Interpretant categories and is 
characterized by Peirce’s further attempts to extend the three-trichotomy theory 
of 1903 to fi rst six, later ten trichotomies (and with 28 and 66 combined signs as 
the result, respectively). Much of that work exists in unfi nished sketches only, 
particularly in his letters to Lady Welby; so, even if bubbling with new ideas, this 
fi nal phase impresses with its imaginary utopias rather than the fi nalized system 
with established results of the preceding period. 
Let us run through these phases. Th e fi rst phase is that of the 1860s with the 
Harvard papers and the American Academy papers, including the famous 1868 
“New list” article with the fi rst presentation of Peirce’s three categories. Surprising 
it is to fi nd how many of the central semiotic issues of the later years are introduced 
already here – yet it may appear even more surprising that the evident root of 
the whole of Peirce’s semiotic programme is found in the basically logical issues 
of how to analyse propositions, inferences and types of arguments. Th e classic 
Aristotelian term-proposition-argument triad – numbered the third trichotomy 
in the 1903 “classic” semiotics doctrine – emerges here as Peirce’s starting point, 
rather than the icon-index-symbol trichotomy oft en considered basic. Bellucci 
quotes Murphey for the two parts of that base: (1) the elementary identifi cation 
of the notion of inference with that of sign – so that the premises function as a 
sign of the conclusion, and (2) the strive for generalizing the types of syllogism 
to a distinction between types of arguments in general. Th ese two combine to 
give the idea that types of arguments should really be described as types of signs. 
Th is classifi cation, in turn, was what gave rise to the abstraction of Peirce’s three 
categories in the “New list” paper.
Already from the beginning, Peirce’s anti-psychologistic stance informed the 
notion of the sign: he saw no diff erence between external and internal signs, the 
two of which incarnate but one and the same logical structure. It is in this context 
that the icon-index-symbol distinction makes its fi rst appearance, here not as a 
classifi cation of signs or of sign aspects, but as types of truths, in the guise of a 
trichotomy between copies, signs, and symbols. Th ey thus refer to diff erent workings 
of propositions, copies (icons) use “sameness of predicates”, signs (indices) are 
individual objects denoting other individual objects, and are thus defi ned by 
reference, while symbols are general and thus the only properly logical type among 
the three truth types, and the logical study of terms-propositions-arguments is a 
study of symbols with respect to their logical properties, “objective symbolistic”. 
Th is is the only of the three which may embody truth or falsity. Not much later, 
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they are defi ned in terms of diff erent logical quantities using concepts inherited 
from the Port-Royal school, ‘denotation’ (Peirce also: ‘breadth’) and ‘connotation’ 
(Peirce also: ‘depth’), respectively. Th us, copies (icons) are pure connotations 
without denotation; signs (indices) are pure denotations without connotation; 
while full, logical symbols have both and denote by connoting. From this, it also 
already follows that icons and indices can form parts of full, propositional symbols, 
performing in that frame their connotative and denotative functions, respectively. 
And already here, we also see the root of the later symbol concept defi ned as 
general signs, natural or acquired – thus not defi ned by convention, as indexical 
“signs” may also be conventional, and not all symbols need to be. It is as subtypes 
of symbols, then, that the classic Aristotelian term-proposition-argument triad is 
originally conceptualized. Already here, a proposition is a rudimentary argument, 
and a term a rudimentary proposition.
In the classifi cation of arguments, the central goal of this early theory, the 
leading principle of inferences becomes central. It is the ineliminable basis of 
the argument and should be expressed as economically as possible. Th e leading 
principle of an argument is isolated when, if used as a premise in a further 
argument, that argument will have the same leading principle as the fi rst one. 
As arguments are signs, and as there are three kinds of truths, the classifi cation 
of leading principles must also be triadic and be defi ned in terms of these truths. 
Th e very ratio for constructing the fi rst version of the icon-index-symbol triad 
is thus to serve the typology of arguments, of symbols, so that, expressed in the 
later terminology, hypotheses (abductions) are arguments which function 
iconically, inductions are arguments which function indexically, and deductions 
are arguments which function symbolically. So, the copy-sign-symbol triad is 
used, in turn, to subdistinguish the argument subtype of the symbol category. 
Already here, remarkably, Peirce insists that the generality of symbols – that is, of 
terms, propositions, and arguments, cannot be reduced to any sum of singulars as 
presumed by Aristotle. And already here, then, lies the root of Peirce’s “extreme 
realism” which teaches that the extension of general terms comprises also all merely 
possible things to which they may apply – an idea which would later lead Peirce’s 
vast interest in the mathematical continuum as an entity larger than any fi nite or 
infi nite set, even transgressing the Cantorian transfi nite hierarchy. As to logical 
proof, Peirce also already had the essentially computational idea that all steps of a 
proof take place by the substitution of signs. Th us, a hypothesis (abduction) is the 
substitution of a conjunctive term (uniting several predicates) with a symbol of 
which it is an icon. Induction is the substitution of an enumerative term (uniting 
several subjects) with a symbol of which it is an index; deduction is the substitution 
of a symbol with another symbol of the same object. Th ese results are what gives 
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rise, in turn, to the three metaphysical categories by the use of the central Kantian 
principle of metaphysical deduction eternally dear to Peirce: the hypostatic 
abstraction of logical forms to metaphysical regularities – in this case, the three 
basic ways of “reducing sensuous impressions to unity”, to express it in Kantese. 
Quality, Relation, and Representation, later generalized to Firstness, Secondness, 
and Th irdness, were the result of that abstraction, and from their interrelations also 
Peirce’s triad of distinction types – dissociation, prescission, and discrimination – 
was derived. On this basis, §15 of the 1868 “New list” emerges as Peirce’s fi rst 
systematic version of the Grammatica Speculativa, presenting taxonomies of signs, 
symbols, and arguments. But – as Bellucci concludes – the categories were reached 
only from the division of signs and the division of arguments; Peirce’s standard 
procedure of derivation, from logic to metaphysics.
The second phase, focused upon the planned logic book of 1873, brings less 
surprise, if not by its relatively small focus upon semiotic and speculative grammar 
issues. As so oft en in his career, Peirce wished to bring his diff erent results in logic 
and philosophy together in one volume. One book plan enumerated fi ve chapters, 
on doubt and belief; inquiry and reality; the categories; signs; and inference, 
respectively. Another plan added more chapters, e.g. on space in logic, breadth 
and depth, probabilities, maxims of reasoning, but not all of these chapters seem 
to have been written (Bellucci 2017: 81). As is evident from these chapter titles, the 
book plans focus more upon logic proper and especially on what was later called 
rhetoric or methodeutic, that is, on philosophy of science and inquiry. Some of the 
ideas seem to have been discussed in the Metaphysical Club in the early 1870s and, 
as the logic book never coalesced, central sections actually written fi nally fl owed 
into the important series of Illustrations of Science papers of 1878, among which 
are “Th e fi xation of belief ” and “How to make our ideas clear”, the birth certifi cates 
of pragmatism. Bellucci quotes Max Fisch for an explanation of the almost 
absolute absence of theory of signs in these papers: they were aimed at a more 
popular audience. He adds the further reason that the semiotic issue was already 
thoroughly dealt with in the 1868–1869 papers. An important generalization 
occurring in this phase is the generalizing step from considering all reasoning 
as taking place in signs to considering all cognition as taking place in signs. Th e 
groundwork of this idea lies in the anti-Cartesian papers “Questions concerning 
certain faculties claimed for man” and “Some consequences of four incapacities” 
of 1868–1869, refusing intuition and introspection as well as thoughts-without-
signs and the existence of an incognizible Ding an Sich reality. Th e latter gave rise 
to the fi rst thorough articulation of Peirce’s “medieval” realism (that is, realism as 
to universals) in the 1871 review of Berkeley, to reappear in the 1873 logic. In that 
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planned book, the semiotic focus would be on symbols exclusively. Here, a stable 
feature of Peirce’s analysis of propositions appears, namely that they separately 
represent an object – a fi rst germ of Peirce’s later, complicated “deduction of the 
Dicisign” in the 1903 Syllabus: 
A representation is such only so far as it is conceived to be one. It is represented 
as representing a certain object. Th is object must therefore be indicated in the 
representation independently of that part of the representation which represents 
it to exist in a certain way. Or we may express ourselves thus: Th ere must be 
connected with any representation of an object another representation which 
represents that object independently & there must be a representation that the 
one represents whatever the other represents. (Peirce 1873, quoted from Bellucci 
2017: 95)
A representation – a proposition – is thus complete; a term incomplete, while the 
argument is perfect. Both term and proposition are thus “wanting” versions of 
the full-blown argument, anticipating Peirce’s doctrine of degeneracy. But overall, 
the logic of 1873 brought little new in speculative grammar, leaving the eff ects on 
that doctrine to Peirce’s progress in the logic of relations from around 1870 to his 
1880–1885 formalizations of propositional and predicate logic. 
Th e third phase, then, is that of these algebras of logic, here called “the Johns 
Hopkins years” aft er Peirce’s position there from 1879–1883 and his collaboration 
with a number of illustrious students to produce those important steps, the fi rst 
linear formalizations of propositional and predicate logic, respectively (Frege 
famously was the fi rst, of course, to formalize both in a graphical, non-linear 
formalism in 1879). Th ey particularly provide a new analysis of propositional 
logic as a whole and, spectacularly in the meta-theoretical introduction to 
the formalization of predicate logic in 1883–1885, a bundle of new results in 
speculative grammar. As to the former, Peirce takes the relation of inclusion or 
inference as the basic notion of logic – as opposed to Boole’s choice of equality 
which Peirce analyses as bidirectional inclusion. Here Peirce distingushes illation, 
the drawing of a conclusion, (“P, therefore Q”) from the leading principle, the 
controlled, truth-preserving character of certain inferences. Leading principles may 
be expressed as conditional propositions (“If P, then Q”), which is why they are 
now taken to be fundamental, and categorical propositions but a derivative form of 
conditional propositions. As Bellucci (2017: 103) says, Peirce’s fi rst algebra of logic 
is, for that reason, simultaneously “[...] an algebra of classes (inclusion), an algebra 
of propositions (implication), and a system of logical consequences (illation)”. Th is 
is why he prefers the asymmetrical and transitive notion of inference as basic to his 
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logic, rather than other possibilities like Boolean equality or “joint denial” which 
he discovered in 1880 (30 years before it become known as “Sheff er’s Stroke”). 
Th is will shape Peirce’s many analyses of propositions for the rest of his career. 
Peirce’s second Algebra of Logic – predicate logic using quantifi cation – builds 
on explicit infl uence from his talented student O. H. Mitchell who formalized 
existential and universal quantifi cation as well as proposed the reduction of all 
illative operations to two: erasure and copulation: “Take the logical product of 
the premises and erase the terms to be eliminated” (quoted from Bellucci 2017: 
110). Peirce generalized this idea to the fi rst version of the prenex formula where 
the quantifi ers assemble at the left  (sometimes called the “Hopkinsian” part of the 
expression) while the proposition with free variables which they quantify over 
(the “Boolean” part) is isolated on the right-hand side of the expression. It is this 
system which is presented, within a speculative grammar framework, in Peirce’s 
second “On the algebra of logic” paper in 1885. In that frame, called “Th ree kinds 
of signs”, Peirce develops a new version of his Speculative Grammar. As Bellucci 
insists, that doctrine is a result of the many new logical results of the 1880–1885 
period, while it is presented as a prolegomenon to the fi nal fruit of it, his predicate 
logic formalization. In the new speculative grammar, the notion of degeneracy is 
introduced, borrowed from the geometry of conic sections where generic sections 
like ellipses and hyperbolas are bordered by rarer, singular, degenerate cases where 
one or several variables vanish, like parabolas, circles, points and intersecting lines. 
Th is principle is now generalized to relative predicates, of which Peirce counted 
0-, 1-, 2-, and 3-valent relations; all higher plural relations may be reduced to 
combinations or products of these predicates (Peirce’s famous “reduction theorem” 
analysed by Robert Burch). Th us, dyadic relations come in genuine forms which 
cannot be expressed in the combination of two monadic ones: “A is the benefactor 
of B”, as well as degenerate forms which can be expressed like: “A is taller than 
B” which can be reduced to monadic statements of the respective heights of A 
and B. “A gives B to C” is a genuine triadic relation, while there are two levels of 
degeneracy for triadic relations. One is a combination of genuine dyadic relations, 
“A parts with B and C receives B”, another of degenerate dyadic relations: “A is 
taller than B and than C”. 
Th is doctrine of degeneracy is now applied to Speculative Grammar. Signs 
as such are genuinely triadic, but they admit of two degrees of degeneracy. One 
degenerate triadicity is the genuine dyadic relation of sign to object – which 
corresponds to indices; another is the degenerate dyadic relation of resemblance – 
which corresponds to icons. Th e non-degenerate sign, then, is a symbol which 
is truly triadic, and it is general in that it represents whatever it is represented 
to represent. Having presented this structural analysis interconnecting symbols, 
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indices, and icons, Peirce proceeds to the next step: to show that every assertion 
and logical argument must make use of all these three sign types. Symbols make 
possible the generality of propositions; indices make possible the proposition’s 
indispensable direct reference to its object, and icons are necessary to depict logical 
relations in order for them to be reasoned about. Th e latter may come as a surprise 
to many who conceive of icons as implying immediate visual resemblance. It is the 
reason why algebra counts as a prime example of iconicity in Peirce: in order for 
relations to be reasoned about, they must be represented iconically, “for reasoning 
consists in the observation that when certain relations subsist others are found” 
(quoted from Bellucci 2017: 117), and such observation requires that relations 
must be iconically accessible. Th is is simultaneously the reason that this is the birth 
place of Peirce’s diagrammatology: the manipulation of diagrammatic icons is the 
road to logical proofs. Th e notion of ‘iconicity’ would not be developed until 15 
years later, but its root, the discussion of which logic representations captures most 
iconically logical structure, is planted here.2 As Bellucci says, these results come 
from Peirce’s appropriation of F. A. Lange’s spatial interpretation of Kant’s idea 
that mathematical concepts must be constructed – this must take place in spatial 
icons, potentially to be manipulated temporally.3 Consequently, Peirce calls his 
fi ve algebraically expressed axioms of predicate logic ‘icons’. As Bellucci succinctly 
sums it up, “We interpret symbols and we are referred to objects by indices, but the 
form in which symbols and indices are connected (the syntax of a formula) can 
only be observed in iconic signs” (Bellucci 2017: 123). Th e requirement of these 
three sign types in the expression of all propositions is thus a main Speculative 
Grammar result of Peirce’s logically fertile Johns Hopkins phase. 
Th e fourth phase occurred in the mid-1890s aft er Peirce’s strongly cosmological 
period around 1890 of “A guess at the riddle” and the “Law of mind” series of 
Monist papers. Here, Peirce rewrote a number of early papers, including “New 
list” and “Fixation”, to go into a planned book titled How to Reason: A Critick of 
Arguments, also sometimes called the Grand Logic. It was refused by the publisher 
Ginn & Co. in 1894, aft er which Peirce planned a Short Logic, the only extant 
chapter of which is a summary of the grammatical parts of How to Reason, titled 
“Of reasoning in general” – which was not accepted for publication either. It is 
here that Peirce for the fi rst time consistently uses his early 1860s terminological 
proposal of ‘Speculative Grammar’ about that part of logic which analyses 
propositions and arguments into their constituent signs, the ‘modi signifi candi’ 
2 See Stjernfelt 2015b on the origin of the ‘iconicity’ concept.
3 Covered in more detail in Bellucci 2013a.
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of the scholastics. Chapters I, II and VI of the fi rst book of How to Reason treat 
Speculative Grammar issues, particularly Chapter II “What is a sign?”. Here, Peirce 
gives a new rendering of the icon-index-symbol triad, now called likeness-indication-
symbol. Symbols are defi ned aft er Greek ‘sym-ballein’ as conventional signs or signs 
by habit, but Peirce simultaneously puts emphasis on his diff erence vis-à-vis Aristotle 
in taking such habits to embrace both external and mental signs, of which the former 
are imputed, but the latter natural. Here, the important insight dawns that symbols 
are not only general signs in that they have a general meaning and thus are applicable 
in true assertions about many objects, but also in the sense that they are themselves 
general objects (a fi rst germ of what was later developed into the qualisign-sinsign-
legisign trichotomy). Based on the 1885 realization that reasoning needs all three 
kinds of signs, Peirce now articulates his “Symbols grow” doctrine – in the process 
of research, symbols may grow in extension by becoming applicable to new objects 
or in comprehension by acquiring more detailed meaning. 
As to assertion, Peirce now sets out to analyse the diff erence between signs 
such as ‘monkeys speak’ and ‘speaking monkeys’ which obviously cannot be an 
issue of composition only. Infl uenced by the hieroglyphic assertion sign meaning 
‘which’, Peirce gives up the standard idea of an assertion as consisting of saturated 
terms interconnected by the ‘is’ copula. Instead, what used to be terms are now 
reanalysed as unsaturated ‘rhemes’ incorporating the copula (‘_is red’), able to be 
saturated by being somehow attached to an object, either directly or by means of 
an intervening index which points out the object. So the assertion now combines 
an indicative and a symbolic sign, and pointing fi gures, pronouns and quantifi ers 
may, in diff erent ways, perform the indicative function. Th e symbolic signs of the 
assertion, in turn, are capable of invoking an idea characterizing in some way the 
object or set of objects indicated.
Finally, the analysis of inference highlights that it necessitates some kind of 
‘monstrative’ sign of illation meaning ‘follows from’. Even if we make explicit 
an inference’s leading principle and add it among its premises, as Bellucci says, 
that will never free us from stating explicitly what the drawn conclusion is. Such 
monstrative signs must be icons, because they show the relation between premises 
and conclusion, even in such simple cases as spatial juxtapositions of propositions. 
This develops Peirce’s 1885 idea that all deductions are diagrammatic, for 
monstrative, “showing” signs are essentially diagrammatic. As Bellucci summarizes 
it: indices only indicate objects, but it takes icons “to demonstrate or show what 
is true about those objects”. Even if in many senses an intermediary phase which 
sums up and details the 1885 achievements, the mid-1890s phase sets the table for 
the ensuing explosive development of Existential Graphs and all the new semiotic 
refl ections connected to this.
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Th e fi ft h phase is characterized by precisely that. Bellucci argues that this phase 
takes its beginnings with the two reviews which Peirce wrote of the German 
logician Ernst Schröder who had become infl uenced by Peirce’s 1880s Algebras 
of Logic and published his own further developments in the monumental three-
volume Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik. In October 1896 and January 1897, 
Peirce reviewed Volumes 1 and 3 of Ernst Schröder’s work (from 1890 and 1895, 
respectively). In these two papers, Peirce restates his Speculative Grammar vis-à-vis 
Schröder and embarks on his fi rst graphical logic system, the ‘Entitative Graphs’. 
Th e fi rst paper, “Th e regenerated logic” again focus upon the analysis of assertions, 
with particular emphasis on semiotics in its draft  version “Th at categorical and 
hypothetical propositions are one in essence” which Bellucci makes central to his 
analysis of this phase. Here, Peirce argues against Schröder’s psychologistic idea 
(from Sigwart), that deductive necessity is one of thinking, a “Denknotwendigkeit”, 
claiming it is rather a necessity of fact. How is such necessity to be analysed? 
Th e task of Grammatica Speculativa – as against Logic Proper and Speculative 
Rhetorics – is to investigate the nature of assertions. Th e logical truth of assertions 
is the subject of Logic Proper, but before that, Grammatica Speculativa should 
investigate the meaning of assertions which is the precondition for their possible 
truth. Th us Grammatica Speculativa must be the study of the signifi cations, the 
“modi signifi candi” of assertions – both Latin terms stemming from the title of 
Th omas of Erfurt’s treatise which was believed, in Peirce’s time, to be by John Duns 
Scotus (Grammatica speculativa sive de modis signifi candi). In the accompanying 
Manuscript 787, Peirce sketches a double investigation strategy of assertions: one is 
a priori, deducing consequences of the theoretical determination of assertions; the 
other is a posteriori, based on empirical cases of conceived assertions and working 
its way “upwards” toward theory by means of abstraction, thus testing the a priori 
results. Th e assertion is a communication to a receiver, stating that, on a certain 
occasion, some idea is compulsory, truth being defi ned as “defi nitive compulsion 
of the investigative intelligence” in the objective, non-subjective sense mentioned. 
From this assumption, three elements are deduced as being needed in an assertion: 
“a sign of the occasion, a sign of the idea, and a sign of the fact that the idea is 
applicable to the occasion for the scientifi c intelligence” (Bellucci 2017: 157). 
First, the idea must be communicated by a sign able to call up a similar sign 
in the receiver, that is, an icon. Th is icon may be communicated by means of a 
symbol, but then this symbol must, originally as well as eff ectively, be connected 
to an icon, picture, or diagram which it is able to conjure again, in the interpreter. 
Th e predicate of an assertion, then, must communicate the idea either directly, 
through an icon, or indirectly, through a symbol (Bellucci 2017: 158). Icons, again, 
may be of fi rst intention, directly presenting some qualities of an object, or they 
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may be second intention, regulating other icons, such as logical conjunctions. So 
icons of fi rst intentions may be synthesized into composite icons by means of 
second intention icons. Th is a priori analysis is then corroborated by a posteriori 
examples in “rhetorical” evidence (Schröder). So all languages must contain an 
iconic fundament of predicates, including the important iconic device of syntax, 
juxtaposing signs to make composite signs (such as assertions). Th e resulting 
assertion, then, is iconic for the important reason expressed as follows: “[...] for 
a great distinguishing property of the icon is that by the direct observation of it 
other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those which suffi  ce to 
determine its construction” (CP 2.279; Bellucci 2017: 160). Assertions allow for 
deductive inferences, which is exactly the procedure for making such discoveries. 
Second, the occasion must be communicated by a sign of the compulsory event 
happening here and now – which is why that sign must be an index, able to point 
out that individual event or object. Indices, again, may be direct, such as pointing 
fi ngers, demonstrative pronouns, etc., or they may be indirect, such as spacetime 
indications or quantifi ers and related instructions of how to locate or delimit 
such objects. Assertions, then, may be compounded from two complexes: one 
is a Predicate complex, a set of First Intention Icons interconnected by Second 
Intention Icons, another is a Subject complex, a set of Indices selecting and 
constraining objects about which the Predicate speaks. Th is is a meta-semiotic 
description of the Algebra of Logic formalization of 1885. 
Th ird, neither the Predicate nor the Subject suffi  ce to constitute an assertion, 
which is why a third sign is needed. Here, Peirce identifi es that sign with the classic 
copula, analysed as a symbol (he should later give another analysis of the third 
sign, e.g. in the Syllabus “Deduction of the Dicisign”). It is the compulsion not of 
the occasion, but of the assertion sign itself. In formalized utterances, it is the main 
logical connective which undertakes the general, symbolic copula function (an 
‘and’ or an ‘implies’, etc.) in addition to its iconic meaning. But this function may 
be implicit: in many languages, the mere juxtaposition of Predicate and Subject 
may suffi  ce to constitute an assertion. 
As a result, Peirce makes an explicit revision of the old Speculative Gram mar 
account of the “New list”: the trichotomy of qualities, references and representations 
should be generalized to “non-relative characters, dual relations, and plural 
relations” (MS 787, 30; Bellucci 2017: 164), failing in 1868 to recognize the latter’s 
irreducibility to dual relations. Only those triadic relations are representations 
which bring the interpretant not only into a relation with the object, but also with 
“some representation of the object” (Bellucci 2017: 165; emphasis in the original). 
Th e recipient must know the object but also a representation of it. Th is is why 
weathercocks, photographs, maps, etc. now are considered symbols, for they may 
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be true and thus able to state assertions. For that same reason, the defi nition of 
symbols as general habits can no longer be co-extensive with the defi nition of 
them as conventions which must be insuffi  cient. “[...] some indices assert, and 
some symbols indicate”, as Bellucci (2017: 166) says, and that is not accounted for 
by the state-of-the-art of Peirce’s 1896 semiotics, as he adds, having no taxonomic 
distinction between symbolic indices like the weathercock or photograph and 
indexical symbols like a quantifi er or demonstrative pronoun. Bellucci makes a 
strong argument that this broadening and resulting unclarity of the mid-1890s 
Speculative Grammar lies beneath the vast refurbishments of the doctrine in the 
ensuing sixth and seventh phases.
In the article mentioned, this forms the backdrop of Peirce’s argument against 
Schröder’s distinction between categoricals and hypotheticals. Th ey are really of 
the same essence, cf. Peirce’s title, because a categorical assertion can be seen as a 
hypothetical argument deprived of its inferential assertiveness: thus every assertion 
is, at bottom, conditional. Categorical propositions like “All men are mortal” is 
expressed, in Peirce’s algebra, hypothetically: “If a man exists, then he is mortal”. 
Also Peirce’s second Schröder review holds implications for Speculative 
Grammar. Here, Peirce introduces the notions of adicity of relations: ‘medads’, 
‘monads’, ‘dyads’, and ‘polyads’, for relations with 0, 1, 2 or more slots to be fi lled 
in with indices referring to Scotist ‘hecceities’, that is, existing individual events 
or objects. Full propositions, then, are 0-valent medads, like a logical atom 
where all loose ends or bonds are saturated. Based on this analysis, he goes on to 
develop his fi rst complete graphical logic formalization, the Entitative Graphs, by 
adding the oval of negation to his fi rst 1882 sketches of graphical representation 
of relations – and immediately aft er the publication of the review, he inverted 
the Graphs to the dual notation of Existential Graphs which he preferred for 
simplicity and developed further for the rest of his career. Peirce immediately 
thought the Entitative Graphs with their emphasis on the conditional were the 
“more philosophical” of the two, Existential Graphs being built on negation and 
conjunction. Later, however he took the ‘scroll’ sign of implication, combined from 
two nested negations, to be fundamental of the latter so it was deemed equally 
conditional, hence “philosophical”. As Bellucci says, many of Peirce’s ensuing 
presentations of the Existential Graphs take their departure in an introductory 
sketch of Speculative Grammar motivating what would follow. In MS 484(1898), 
Peirce realizes that no pure Icons nor Indices may exist; the former would be a 
“pure sense-quality” without any parts; the latter would be a “pure sense-reaction” 
of complete individuality, but all such reactions are but instances of general 
patterns. So the two are limit cases only. An icon represents its object as a “mere 
dream”, an index as an “active, existent thing”, and a symbol integrates these two in 
 A Peirce for the 21st century 603
representing its object as having both the capacity of being iconized and of being 
indicated (from Bellucci 2017: 175–176). All signs, then, are more or less symbolic, 
and all symbols assert. Th e subtypes of symbols, terms-propositions-arguments, 
then, do not diff er in their assertion, but rather in the “vagueness or explicitness 
of their parts” (Bellucci 2017: 177) – in a term, the “representative and reactive” 
aspects are left  vague; in a proposition, the representative, reason, is left  vague, but 
the reactive is made explicit. 
Th e problems gradually developed in this phase, with the almost imperial rule 
of symbols understood as assertions, would make Peirce’s early system fi nally 
explode in the sixth and seven phases. 
The sixth phase is centred around the drafts of Minute Logic of 1901–1902, 
comprising four chapters – which were left  unfi nished and never published, aft er 
Peirce’s unsuccessful application for Carnegie support in the summer of 1902 
in which Speculative Grammar issues are also developed. Planned chapters on 
the three branches of logic never materialized but the introductory synopsis of 
the book contains a new representation of them. Here, a complete reform of 
Speculative Grammar was proposed, that of taking the trichotomies of Term-
Proposition-Argument and Icon-Index-Symbol no longer as classifi cation of signs, 
but of semiotic parameters, simultaneously opening the new issue of how such 
parameters combine. Th is initiative solves the riddle of the “symbolic indices” 
such as the weathercock and the quantifi er: the former now becomes an indexical 
proposition and the latter an indexical rhema. 
Th e new theory is developed on the basis of a changed conception of the logic-
semiotic relation – earlier, logic was the objective part of the study of symbols, 
in itself a part of semiotic: logic as a branch of a branch of semiotics, as Bellucci 
says. Now, the two are all but identifi ed: Logic as formal semiotics. Consequently, 
the related sign defi nitions dispenses altogether with any reference to the human 
mind, broadening Peirce’s thoroughgoing anti-psychologism in logic to cover all 
of semiotics. Now, icons and indices become fully-fl edged objects of logic, even if 
symbols remain the over-arching concept because arguments, resting on general 
leading principles as they are, must invariably be symbols. Furthermore, the 
analysis of inference types in terms of signs is changed, and fi nally, propositions 
other than symbols must be acknowledged: “Arguments are symbols that represent 
that certain icons (in abduction), indices (in induction), or symbols (in deduction) 
represent (and thus can be substituted by) certain other symbols” (Bellucci 2017: 
193).
In Minute Logic, Speculative Grammar is preceded for the fi rst time by a section 
on Phenomenology (the new generalized, hypothetical doctrine of the categories) 
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providing the formal tools for the division of signs; now the three categories appear 
as Originality-Obsistence-Transuation, the latter two with one and two degenerate 
versions, respectively. Th e central reform of Minute Logic is to pass from seeing 
Term-Proposition-Argument as a subdivision of Symbols from the Icon-Index-
Symbol trichotomy, to taking instead the two to be independent classifi cations 
of all signs. Only then will combinations like ‘indexical propositions’ become 
possible. What is at issue now is the extent to which icons and indices may be 
terms-propositions-arguments:
A proposition may either be a Symbol or an Index, but its Subject must either be 
an Index, or a Symbol referring in a particular indexical manner to an Index. A 
Rhema may be either Symbol, Index or Icon, but if not an icon, it must, at least, 
refer to Icons. Consequently, since Arguments are composed of Propositions, 
and Propositions of Rhemata, it follows that for a Proposition, Icons and Indices 
are required, and for an Argument Icons, Indices, and Symbols. (MS 425, quoted 
from Bellucci 2017: 198) 
Th us, the two new independent trichotomies are not so independent as to combine 
freely. Yet, only ad hoc rules are considered (such as: icons are too simple to 
function as propositions or arguments). Th us, six combined classes become the 
result: (1–3) rhemes – iconic, indexical or symbolic; (4–5) propositions – indexical 
or symbolic; (6) arguments. As to the subdivision of arguments, that task is double, 
their justification and strength is a matter of critical logic; only their purely 
semiotic defi nition belongs to Speculative Grammar. Here, an important inversion 
takes place: in 1867, induction was indexical and deduction was symbolic – 
now the two change places; a conundrum that would keep occupying Peirce for 
the rest of his career. In 1867, deduction went from symbol to symbol, induction 
from index to symbol, and abduction from icon to symbol. Now he claims that his 
original conception of Abduction had confused two ideas: abduction proper and 
qualitative induction (induction from a sample to a whole, but regarding characters 
and comprehension rather than objects and extension). In 1901, he had introduced 
the idea that Ab-De-Induction were not only types of inferences but also stages of 
investigation, in that order. In the same period, he had developed his bipartition of 
deduction into corollarial and theorematic, of which he boasts in the 1902 Carnegie 
application, as the direct and indirect, more complicated, formal-experiment-
driven, drawing of consequences, respectively. Simultaneously, induction is now of 
three kinds, crude-qualitative-quantitative. Th e semiotic interpretation of the three 
now claims that they are Originary, Obsistent, Transuasive arguments, respectively. 
Abduction (cleansed for qualititative induction) remains iconic in the sense that 
it proposes a hypothesis so that the fact of the premises is an icon of the fact of 
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the conclusion. Deduction is now indexical, because it forces its conclusion upon 
us (when we would fi nally fi nd that conclusion, as it were): the diagram of the 
premises is an index of the diagram of the conclusion. Induction now becomes 
symbolic: the premises in terms of a sample of observed data are symbols of their 
conclusion which follows by a (fallible) habit rule of thumb governed by the general 
conception of the (abductive) hypothesis they are built on. Th is inversion of the 
places of Deduction and Induction is further corroborated by the development of 
the mentioned binary-ternary subtypologies of the two. Already in the following 
year, however, Peirce expresses doubt as to this new order of things, and from 1905 
he is back to the 1867 position again. Th e First Reform step from trichotomies of 
signs to combinatory trichotomies of sign aspects, however, came to stay, and 
would play centre stage in the last two phases of Bellucci’s narrative. 
With the seventh phase, we reach the “classic” doctrine of the 1903 Syllabus 
mentioned in the beginning – with three trichotomies combined into ten sign 
classes, now guided by an explicit set of combination rules. Th is and the fi nal, 
eighth, phase are extensively covered by Bellucci in the last two, almost book-
length chapters of the book. Th e Syllabus originated as an accompanying text to be 
disseminated to the audience of the Lowell lectures given by Peirce in Cambridge 
in the autumn of 1903, and the printed version contained a classifi cation of the 
sciences, ethics of terminology and an intro to the Existential Graphs. Yet it did 
not contain what Peirce had struggled with the most, namely the new version of 
Speculative Grammar aft er the 1902 reform principles. As already mentioned, it 
was worked through twice, fi rst in “Sundry logical conceptions” (SLC), then in 
“Nomenclature and divisions of triadic relations” (NDTR), with the latter adding 
the new trichotomy of Qualisigns-Sinsigns-Legisigns to give the “classic” ten-sign 
combinatory. As mentioned in the beginning, these papers would assume status 
of classics of semiotics through their central use in Vol. 2 of the Collected Papers in 
the 1930s. Bellucci’s long chapter on the Syllabus provides an account of the origin 
and compositional history of these central documents which is unprecedented in 
detail. Th e former text seemingly took a long time to compose and exists in two 
parallel versions, while the latter, more slender and defi nitive, was composed on a 
short notice in November 1903. We shall not here go into the fascinating intricacies 
of this story; suffi  ce it to summarize its Speculative Grammar results. 
Th e fi rst version of the SLC begins, as Minute Logic, with a discussion of the 
cate gories in phenomenological terms including a restatement of the degeneracy 
theory and a presentation of the mature classifi cation of the sciences: Mathematics-
Phenomenology-Normative Sciences (Esthetics-Ethics-Logic)-Metaphysics, 
where each of the three normative sciences has a physiological, classifi catory, and 
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methodical part – among which Speculative Grammar forms the physiological 
part of logic. In its presentation of the icon-index-symbol triad, already here it 
is emphasized that symbols exist in replicas only, a foreshadowing of the new 
trichotomy developed in the NDTR. As to the term-proposition-argument triad, 
Peirce now realizes that its generalization aft er the First Reform necessitates a new 
terminology, now that it is no longer a tripartition of symbols only: sumisign-
dicisign-suadisign is the new proposal, with one-two-three parts respectively – 
and of which ‘dicisign’ should survive longer than the other two terms. Already 
here, it has the main focus, and the fi rst version of Peirce’s “deduction of the 
dicisign” applies the a priori method to elucidating why it is that dicisigns must 
have two parts. Th is is the case, because in order to represent the objects as real 
and independent of itself, the sign “represents a Secondness of its object, and 
represents it in the form of a Secondness” (MS 478, quoted from Bellucci 2017: 
220) – which requires two parts of the dicisign, one representing the object and 
the other representing the sign’s own relation to the object, something which 
can be achieved only by representing it by an index. Th is analysis seemingly was 
not deemed suffi  cient, for it was considerably extended in the second version of 
SLC. What is further elaborated here is the proposition’s new-found necessity 
of representing itself. Th e second deduction of the Dicisign belongs to the most 
complicated parts of the Speculative Grammar in the whole of Peirce’s work, and 
Bellucci’s detailed and illuminating analysis forms a high point of his book and 
brings our understanding of Peirce’s fertile analysis of propositions much further.4 
I shall not go through all its details here. Th e proposition is not only a sign that 
can be true or false, it is a sign that professes to be so, Peirce had said already in 
1896, and it does so by means of referring to its own relation to its object. Th e 
proposition sign claims about itself that it is actually connected to the fact which 
it represents as true. Th us it represents itself as an index of its object. Here, the 
object, the thing or event indexically referred to, importantly diff ers from the 
fact which the dicisign represents. It is true that the dicisign depicts the fact that 
it represents and that the structure of the fact is the syntax of the dicisign, but 
this is the result of a deeper meta-structure, namely the dicisign’s reference to 
its own object-reference. Th is is possible because of the dicisign’s interpretant, 
which claims that the dicisign is an index of its object. But as Bellucci observes, 
this immediately adds new complexity to the notion of interpretant whose object, 
standardly, was the very same as that of the original sign. Now, the interpretant’s 
object is the sign’s relation to its object. Th is leads Peirce to a new distinction 
between the primary and the secondary objects of the dicisign – the former being 
4 I myself give a presentation of the Deduction of the Dicisign in Chapter 3 of Stjernfelt 2014.
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the standard object, the latter being the sign’s indexical relation to that object. 
Here, Bellucci claims that this distinction, never to appear again in this wording, 
is later solved by Peirce’s ensuing distinctions between kinds of interpretants. In 
the fi nal SLC version, this is begun by the distinction between (1) interpretants 
of a proposition which may be anything which logically follows from it, and (2) 
the essential intepretant which interprets it as a proposition. Th is analysis of the 
dicisign as a sign whose interpretant represents it as an index of its object is now 
taken as the premise of a proof that such a sign must be internally structured in 
two parts: this is because the sign can only be represented as an index if it is, in 
itself, structured like an index (if not, the interpretant could not represent it as 
such). Hence, it must have two parts, corresponding to the index and its object. 
Th e secondary object’s double structure is, as Bellucci (2017: 232) says, projected 
onto the dicisign itself. And as the secondary object’s two parts are the primary 
object and the sign itself, respectively, the dicisign’s two parts must represent those 
two parts. Th us, what is called in brief the Predicate of a proposition is really 
“the representation of the way in which the proposition itself represents its object” 
(Bellucci 2017: 232, emphasis in the original). While the former part must be an 
index, this latter part must be or contain an icon, for that is the only sign which 
does not clearly distinguish its object and interpretant – but an icon of the dicisign 
itself. Th is accounts for the double structure of predicate rhemata, including an 
iconic core branching into unsaturated slots. Th e predicate, then, is an icon of the 
character which this sign attributes to its objects (referred to by subject indices in 
the slots). Peirce now subjects this complicated a priori deduction of the dicisign 
to the a posteriori – rhetoric – confi rmation test, fi nding it to hold for categorical 
and hypothetical, dis-, and conjunctions, informational symbols as well as dito 
indices, etc. A fi nal, important question here addresses the syntax of the dicisign:5 
what keeps Subject and Predicate together in order to form a proposition? Peirce’s 
answer here is that this is the very juxtaposition of the two parts – a syntax more 
general than linguistics since dicisigns now embrace also non-symbolic material.6 
All in all, Bellucci’s detailed analysis of Peirce’s deductions of the dicisign 
surpasses all existing eff orts pertaining to this in Peirce studies – and, more general, 
it also goes to emphasize the centrality of propositions-assertions-dicisigns in the 
whole of Peirce’s semiotics. Th ere is no “deduction of the icon” nor of the index – 
why? Because propositions and their interlinking in arguments simply form the 
central explanandum of the whole of Peirce’s semiotics, and all the subtle distinctions 
of Speculative Grammar serve the purpose of explaining them and their structure.
5 Bellucci treats this under the headline of the ‘unity’ of the proposition in his 2014.
6 See Stjernfelt (in press b) for a further elaboration of this idea.
608 Frederik Stjernfelt
Still, the most important innovation of the seventh phase awaits elucidation. 
The final SLC version is the locus also for the introduction of hypoicons and 
hyposemes (or subindices), that is, signs which are primarily icons or indices 
(given that no pure icons or indices exist). Th e disappearance of these terms in 
the fi nal NDTR text signals that the existence of such general icons and indices is 
considered to be explained by the addition of a new third trichotomy. In the Lowell 
lectures manuscripts worked out in the course of summer and fall 1903, Peirce 
began systematically distinguishing e.g. Symbols and Graphs as such from their 
individual Replicas. In the NDTR, this observation is theoretically elaborated into 
an autonomous, new trichotomy, that of qualisign-sinsign-legisign, on a par with 
the two standard trichotomies playing centre stage in the Speculative Grammar 
ever since the 1860s. Bellucci interestingly shows how the introduction of this 
triad was prompted by Peirce’s ongoing development of the Gamma part of the 
Existential Graphs, the part transcending the propositional and predicate logics 
of the Alpha and Beta parts.7 Gamma graphs, among many other things, should 
be able to represent hypostatic abstractions, that is, the deductive creation of new, 
higher-level subjects out of predicates (e.g. ‘Redness’ out of ‘red’). Th is involved a 
whole series of new abstract meta-signs able to characterize signs and their relata, 
such as “A is a medad” (a full proposition); “B is in the dyadic relation A to C”, 
and many more. In MS. 467 of Nov. 1903, such a list includes a special sign for 
the second-order proposition “A is a legisign”, further developed in MS 508 with 
the distinction between a graph as a legisign and the individual replica instances 
of the same graph. Th e ambiguity of the term ‘graph’ in Gamma thus necessitated 
the distinction between graphs formaliter (as repeatable legisigns) and graphs 
materialiter (as individual sinsigns or replicas). Th is distinction is now developed 
in NDTR and its draft  in MS 800 – amounting to Bellucci’s Second Reform of 
Speculative Grammar – and it is also present in the later versions of some of the 
Lowell lectures. NDTR thus forms the fi nal word on Speculative Grammar of the 
Syllabus; it was intended to replace SLC rather than continue it, and Bellucci fi nds 
indications it was meant to be printed as a fi nal result of investigations. Th e two 
quick reforms – the 1902 combinatory of sign aspects, and the 1903 addition of a 
third trichotomy (numbered the fi rst) – now necessitated the elaboration of a set 
of principles for trichotomy combination, which fi rst appeared in NTDR. It has 
to do with the sequence of trichotomies which are meticulously presented in the 
7 Aft er developing the Alpha version of EGs which formalize propositional logic, Peirce 
added new signs in order to capture predicate logic in Beta. Gamma became the headline of a 
whole bundle of unfi nished further additions aming to cover temporal logic, speech act logic, 
second order logic, three-value-logic, abstractions, etc. Pietarinen (in press) is collecting all 
Peirce’s writings on the EGs.
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order I. qualisign-sinsign-legisign; II. icon-index-symbol; and III. rheme-dicent sign/
dicisign-argument. For their combination machinery, Bellucci cites and simplifi es 
Robert Burch’s instructive summation in three rules: (1) each trichotomy has three 
consecutive, numbered members 1–2–3; (2) trichotomies are linearly ordered 
(like the I-II-III sequence mentioned); (3) combinations of the 3x3 sign aspects 
are allowed if they satisify the ordering rule: fi rst element ≥ second element ≥ 
third element, where the ordinals of elements refer to I-II-III, respectively, and 
the “greater than” sign refers to the number of the element in its trichotomy. Th is 
calculus results in the famous 10 combined signs of the Syllabus which Bellucci 
lays out and interprets in great detail. As these 10 signs have oft en been presented 
and discussed elsewhere, we shall not go further into them here.8 Important 
subdivisions not caught by this new a priori net of ten, however, include the three 
kinds of arguments (which started the whole Speculative Grammar crusade almost 
40 years earlier) or their recently developed subtypes, nor rhemes distinguished 
aft er valency, nor the distinction between a proposition and its assertion, etc. 
Aft er this demanding tour de force, both on the part of Peirce and of his intellectual 
biographer, the panoply of ideas of the last and eighth phase 1904–1908 almost 
feels like a piece of relaxing entertainment. It is inaugurated by Bellucci’s Th ird 
Reform, the introduction of further subdistinctions between two types of Objects – 
Immediate and Dynamic – and three types of Interpretants, Immediate, Dynamic, 
and Representative, respectively (the term chosen for the latter varies; Eventual, 
Final, etc. are also used). Just like the three 1903 trichotomies are based on (1) the 
sign itself; (2) its relation to its object; (3) its relation to its interpretant, respectively, 
further subdivisions of the two latter ones naturally will form bases for further 
trichotomies. Th is takes place in two steps, up to six in 1904–1905 and two stabs 
at ten in 1905–1906 and 1908, respectively. Ordering these trichotomies linearly 
seemingly is the premise for combining further sign types from them, potentially 
resulting in 28 or 66 classes of signs, respectively.9 Many interpreters have revelled 
in fantasies of the fertility of so many new sign types which were never listed, much 
less described by Peirce; fewer have looked into the diffi  cult defi nitory problems 
of the proposals which received far less groundwork than the 10-classes Syllabus 
taxonomy. Among those few count Murphey, T. L. Short – and, of course, Bellucci. 
8 Here, I disagree with Bellucci on a fi ne point, namely the interpretation of the seventh of 
the ten Syllabus sign classes, the ‘Dicent Indexical Legisign’, see Stjernfelt (in press a). 
9 Queiroz and Stjernfelt (in press) collect a set of investigations on the “Extended Peirce” of 
Bellucci’s Phase Eight.
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Th e six-triad model of 1904 adds to the three Syllabus trichotomies referring 
to the sign itself, its relation to its object, and its relation to its interpretant, 
respectively, three new divisions, referring to the sign’s relation to its immediate 
object, to its immediate and its dynamic interpretants, respectively. Particularly the 
former occupies Bellucci who makes a controversial but as far as I can see correct 
interpretation of it.10 Part of the problem is to determine what the “immediate 
object” is that defi nes the relevant trichotomy. Bellucci does a beautiful job in 
tracing the appearance of this term in Peirce, and Peirce’s defi nition of it as the 
object “as it is represented by the sign”. What in the world does that mean? – 
as Bellucci asks. Here, he is a staunch defender of the point that the Immediate 
Object has to do with the identity of the object, not with any sort of description 
of it. I perfectly agree in this – as against many Peirce scholars who have taken 
the Immediate Object to be some sort of preliminary description of the Object.11 
But such a thing would be an Interpretant category, not an Object category. Th e 
Immediate Object has to do with how the sign identifi es and claims to establish 
contact with its real, Dynamic Object. 
Here, Bellucci runs into a minor problem, I think. He refuses that the 
distinction has anything to do with the Primary/Secondary Objects of the SLC 
discussed above, saying that the Secondary Object is “the representation that the 
sign is a sign [...] of its object” while the Immediate Object is “that part of the 
sign that indicates the dynamic object” (Bellucci 2017: 288). I am not convinced 
the diff erence between the two is so crucial as to prevent the former from being 
a fi rst stab at the latter. Moreover, the latter is also not a quite correct description, 
as far as I can see. Bellucci builds this on Peirce’s explanation of immediacy: “to 
say that A is immediate to B means that it is present in B” (Bellucci 2017: 291). 
From this, Bellucci concludes that “to be present in a sign” can mean nothing else 
than to “be part of a sign” (Bellucci 2017: 291). Can it not? Could it not mean to 
be presented, or even “represented” in or by a sign, which Peirce says many times 
about the Immediate Object? ‘Represent’ in Peirce is a reference relation, not a 
signifi cation relation, so the idea that the IO is the Object as “represented by the 
sign” could be paraphrased as the Object as “referred to by the sign”, highlighting 
the indexical reference relation playing centre stage in the “Deduction of the 
dicisign”. 
Actually, Bellucci’s own interpretation of the resulting trichotomy also points in 
this direction. Th at trichotomy is the one sometimes (among other terminological 
attempts) called ‘vague’, ‘singular’, and ‘general’ signs. Bellucci rightly interprets 
10 See also Bellucci 2015.
11 I make a similar argument in Chapter 3 of Stjernfelt 2014.
 A Peirce for the 21st century 611
this as the introduction of the age-old distinction between particular, singular, 
and universal propositions (present in e.g. Kant’s fi rst Critique). Th is gives the 
implication that this new distinction only holds between propositions, and that 
the Immediate Object is an issue of their quantifi cation – existential, singular 
and universal, respectively. Th e counterintuitive result follows immediately that 
only propositions have immediate objects – fi tting well with Peirce’s old idea that 
propositions make their object reference explicit, by means of explicit Subjects such 
as indices, proper names, quantifi cations etc. I think Bellucci is completely correct 
in these conclusions – strangely, he does not stop to consider their implications for 
the resulting 28 signs of the six-triad taxonomy combinatory. If a whole trichotomy 
only pertains to propositions, the resulting amount of combined signs will be 
less than 28, depending upon its place in the linear ordering of divisions. Th is 
interpretation also relativizes Bellucci’s idea that the Immediate Object is simply 
“part of ” the sign. It is correct, of course, that Subject signs like pointing fi ngers, 
proper names or quantifi ers are part of propositions, but Peirce does not identify 
the Immediate Object with the Subject. Rather, he says, time and time again, 
that the Immediate Object is something which is “represented” by the sign. Th e 
Immediate Object is something referred to by the sign, but in another way than its 
external, dynamic Object – I think it is nothing but the famous claimed, indexical 
connection of the sign to its Object (so central in the Deduction of the Dicisign). 
Peirce sometimes described quantifi ers as retrieval recipes – they describe how 
to get from the sign to the object (via the selection by the sign utterer or by the 
receiver, as Bellucci repeats). I would say it is this indexical connection, retrieval 
or identifi cation process terminating in a Dynamic Object, claimed possible by the 
sign, which constitutes its Immediate Object. 
Be that as it may; as to the two additional interpretant trichotomies, the 
Immediate Interpretant gives rise to the trichotomy of Feelings, Experiences, 
Th oughts, while the Dynamic Interpretant has the subtypes of interpretation by 
defi nition, by action, by submission, respectively. In general, the three interpretant 
categories should come to be interpreted as follows: the initial interpretant is how 
the sign itself demands to be interpreted; the dynamic interpretant is how it is 
actually interpreted in a situation of use; the representative (or fi nal, or normal, or 
eventual) interpretant is everything which the sign may ultimately be interpreted 
to mean in the fi nal analysis (echoing Peirce’s convergence-to-truth epistemology). 
Bellucci interestingly discusses Short’s idea that the Dynamic Interpretant 
trichotomies may be used to distinguish the expression of and the assertion of 
a proposition and, more generally, the possibilities of generalizing to a series of 
other speech acts mentioned by Peirce in the 1904 Kaina Stoicheia article. In any 
case, the discovery of the distinction between a proposition and the assertion of 
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it, presented in that article, is one motor driving the new division attempts, for it 
was not derivable from the three-division theory of the Syllabus. 
Bellucci does not present a table of the six trichotomies nor spends much 
time on their rules of combination, maybe because he hastens to continue to 
the fi rst 10-trichotomy theory of 1905–1906. A revised table of October 1905 
shows six trichotomies, now with a seventh (abstract-concrete-collective) added 
as a subdivision of the middle, Singular sign category of the Immediate Object 
trichotomy and the dynamic interpretant trichotomy reformulated to signs 
interpreted by sympathy, compulsion, reason, respectively – and on the same day, 
he makes a note that four further divisions must be considered. So, that forms 
the start of the fi rst ten-trichotomy period. Th e four further divisions result from 
an extension based on the subdivision principle saying that Seconds admit one 
degenerate version while Th irds admit two. Th us, there should be two divisions 
according to the Dynamic Object, two divisions to the Dynamic Interpretant, 
and three to the Representative or Final Interpretant, all in all seven, which is 
four more than when each of these instances had only one division. Several draft s 
are developed in October, adding new ideas such as a speech act trichotomy of 
Interrogative-Imperative-Signifi cative pertaining to the Immediate Interpretant. 
A central problem should remain, however, over all the ten-division attempts up 
until 1908, namely that the rules for combination of divisions are never amended 
to fi t the new more complicated situation, and even the canonical linear sequence 
of trichotomies, required to establish their combination, are never settled upon. As 
Bellucci says, this has the elementary reason that the six- and ten-division schemas 
depend upon the degeneracy calculus which gives a hierarchical tree structure 
whose linearization is never satisfactorily addressed. Th is is a main reason why 
all the six- and ten-division attempts of 1904–1908 remain an unfi nished quarry 
of – very interesting, to be sure – hypotheses. 
Interpretants now account for no less than six of the ten trichotomies, and as 
interpretants are all concerned with various types of sign eff ects, Bellucci reasonably 
interprets the ten-division crusade as one primarily concerned with or even driven 
by the introduction of speech acts into the sign taxonomy. Th us, the terminological 
change from the established rheme-dicisign-argument to seme-pheme-delome is 
not one of mere substitution, but of generalization, realizing that there are other 
speech acts to be performed on the basis of propositions than asserting dicisigns – 
thus, dicisigns remain as a prominent subcategory of the more general ‘pheme’ 
category, also comprising other speech acts than assertions. Bellucci ingeniously 
fi nds equivalents to Austin’s famous locuationary-illocutionary-perlocutionary 
distinction pertaining to speech acts in the ten divisions: the locutionary aspect 
corresponds to the well-known rheme-dicisign-argument of the representative 
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interpretant; the illocutionary to the mentioned interrogative-imperative-indicative 
of the immediate interpretant; the perlocutionary to the two dynamic interpretant 
divisions of resulting feeling-fact-sign and sympathy-compulsion-representation. In 
this reconstruction, four of the ten divisons are really speech act trichotomies, 
eff ectively refusing Austin’s famous quip that “With all his 66 division of signs, 
Peirce does not, I believe, distinguish between a sentence and a statement”.12 An 
early 1906 version again changes terminology and clarifi es the two new among 
the Normal (Representative, Final) Interpretant divisions: Strange-Common-
Novel, and Monadic-Dyadic-Triadic. A later 1906 version, aft er the famous Monist 
“Prolegomena” paper, makes many terminological changes, most notably Tinge-
Token-Type for Quali-Sin-Legisign (later Tone-Token-Type) – but also moves 
trichotomies around and introduces the Ab-In-Deduction division, the mother of 
the whole speculative grammar adventure, as number 10, the fi nal among the 
three Eventual Interpretant divisions – now remarkably revising its order back to 
the 1867 original. 
In the pragmatism papers of around 1907, a new division of interpretants, 
emotional-energetic-logical, is introduced, and Peirce scholars have argued over 
whether it is but a terminologically new version of the standard initial-dynamic-
fi nal division; here Bellucci sides with Short (correctly, I think) in claiming that 
it is indeed an independent and non-confl icting division adding new speech 
acts dimensions to Peirce’s late semiotics, as a further division of perlocutionary 
eff ects. It is also in those papers that Peirce makes explicit his important notion 
of ‘collateral observation’: the interpreter of a proposition must have some sort 
of previous experience, directly or indirectly, with the object of the proposition’s 
subject – otherwise the interpreter would not know at all what is talked about, 
and the interpretation eff ectively shrinks to an unsaturated rheme. Finally, in the 
same papers, Peirce clarifi es that the Final Interpretant cannot be a sign itself, but 
nothing but a “habit of action”; it cannot be just another conception in an infi nite 
semiotic sequence of conception interpretants. Th at habit, of course, may concern 
both external action habits and thought habits.
The final push forward of Speculative Grammar takes place in the 1908 
rearticulation of the ten-division schema in a December letter to Lady Welby. 
Particularly the trichotomy pertainting to the Immediate Object undergoes 
surprising changes, prompted by Peirce’s development of his doctrine of 
“continuous predicates”.13 Peirce’s idea is that predicates may be subjected to 
an analysis hypostatically abstracting all unanalysed stuff  in them so that what 
12 Austin 1961: 87n1; see also Stjernfelt 2014: 101.
13 Bellucci treats this issue also in his 2013b; see also Stjernfelt 2016.
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remains is but a naked, continuous, relational structure. Th e example is that “Cain 
kills Abel” may be hypostatically abstracted to “Cain stands in the relation of 
Killing to Abel”, eff ectively substituting the triadic relation ‘_stands in the relation 
of_to_’ for the dyadic relation ‘_kills_’, simultaneously creating the new hypostatic 
object of ‘killing’. Such an analysis can only be performed a limited number of 
times until a rock bottom is reached because ‘_stands in the relation of standing 
in the relation of_ to_’ means the same thing (cf. Peirce’s beloved quote “Nota 
notae est nota rei ipsius”, the property of the property is a property of the thing 
itself). Such a predicate is “continuous” in the sense that adding further relations 
adds nothing, just like adding a point or a line segment to a continuous line adds 
nothing to its continuity. Now, in the 1908 ten-division scheme, the Immediate 
Object is redefi ned in the following manner: the sign must indicate the Dynamic 
object “[...] by a hint; and this hint, or its substance, is the Immediate Object” 
(Bellucci 2017: 336). A hint, of course, is an index. Th e corresponding division of 
signs is now changed into designatives-descriptives-copulants where designatives 
are normal subjects of propositions, descriptives are normal predicates –  while 
copulants are continuous in the sense given. Th ey are signs like ‘_possesses the 
character_’, ‘_stands in the relation of_to_’, ‘_ occurs concurrently with_’; other 
candidates could be ‘_is identical to_’, ‘_is teridentical to_and_’, ‘_implies_’, ‘_is 
co-localized with_’, etc. Of such signs Peirce says that “Th ese signs cannot be 
explicated, they must convey Familiar universal elementary relations of logic. We 
do not derive these notions from observation, nor by any sense of being opposed, 
but from our own reason” (Bellucci 2017: 337, italics in the original). Whether the 
vague-singular-general division is abandoned or should be resurrected as some 
additional subdivision of the new Immediate Object division, remains unclear. It 
must be admitted that some of the fi nal 1908 versions of the ten-division schema, 
such as the polished and stark version of MS 795, assume a clarity and seeming 
defi nitivity which is indeed alluring, even if some of the trichotomies remain 
virtually unexplained and the solution to the issue of their composibility would 
remain wanting. 
Bellucci’s fi nal chapter on the eighth phase is rich and bewildering, as its subject 
matter itself, but still it provides us with an orientation structure for understanding 
the intentions and aims taking Peirce to develop his fi nal systems, primarily the 
experienced need for including speech act aspects into the taxonomic system. 
I have here presented Bellucci’s results in some detail. Th e reason is that a mere 
lauding of the book, however well-deserved, would convince no-one about the 
character of its qualities. It goes without saying that the much more fi ne-grained 
presentation in the book itself is as indispensable as it is rewarding. In summarizing 
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its main results, I hope to convince the reader that there is no way around, for 
serious Peirce scholars, to get acquainted with the detail of Bellucci’s argument. 
If it gives us a Peirce for the 21st century it is not only because it presents 
the motivations for Peirce’s semiotic development in a new level of detail and 
with many hitherto unrecognized connections and motivations charted, but also 
because it convincingly rearticulates that semiotics in its proper place: as a tool 
box, unprecedented in detail, in order to analyse and understand propositions, 
arguments and reasonings. Doing so, it indirectly gives us, simultaneously, a 
picture of the world in which such logical structures play a far more prominent 
role and have a much more widespread appearance than normally assumed, in 
human as well as non-human nature. 
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